Reevaluting Combat Cohesion:The British Second Army in The Northwest Europe Campaign of the Second World War by Fennell, Jonathan
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
Document Version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Fennell, J. (2015). Reevaluting Combat Cohesion: The British Second Army in The Northwest Europe Campaign
of the Second World War. In A. King (Ed.), Frontline: Combat and Cohesion in the Twenty-First Century. (pp.
134-166). [7] Oxford University Press.
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
	   1	  
An edited version of this paper appeared in 
 Anthony King (ed.), Frontline: Combat and Cohesion in the Twenty-First Century 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
 
This can be found here: 
http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780198719663.do 
 
Reevaluating Combat Cohesion: 
The British Second Army in The Northwest Europe Campaign of the Second World 
War. 
 
 
© Dr Jonathan Fennell  
Defence Studies Department,  
King’s College London  
 
 
Abstract: 
This paper explores the role of morale in the military strategic process and 
demonstrates, for the first time, how it is possible to construct a methodologically 
sound quantitative approach for assessing morale in an historical battle context (the 
British Army’s progress through Northwest Europe in 1944/5). It proposes a 
functional conceptualisation of morale, which focuses its meaning and relevance on 
motivation and the willingness to act in a manner required by an authority or 
institution. These approaches, at least when applied to the Northwest Europe 
campaign, point to the need to reevaluate the dominant theories on combat cohesion. 
It is concluded that strategy, understood as an iterative multilevel process rather than 
a level of war or activity situated only as a bridge between national policy and tactics, 
lies at the heart of any understanding of combat cohesion. 
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Reevaluating Combat Cohesion: 
The British Second Army in The Northwest Europe Campaign of the Second 
World War. 
 
Jonathan Fennell 
 
As the United Kingdom’s involvement in combat operations in Afghanistan comes to 
an end in 2014, it is appropriate that the contributers to this edited collection reflect 
upon the 13 years of fighting. Such reflection, however, is best situated within a 
broader context than the pressing military and political imperatives of the early 
twentyfirst century. Thus, this chapter aims to broaden the historical and conceptual 
perspective by building on the considerable body of research on the material and 
tactical underpinnings of successful military performance in the twentieth century and 
examining the role of morale. Indeed, Stephen Biddle has pointed to the need to give 
morale ‘systematic theoretical attention’.1 The chapter explores the conceptualisation 
of military morale and argues that morale remains ill defined, inconsistently used and 
poorly understood. It proposes that in order for the concept of morale to have 
appropriate explanatory value in a critical analysis of the past, particularly in a 
combat environment, it should be clearly differentiated from definitions associated 
solely or primarily with mood or group dynamics. A functional conceptualisation is, 
therefore, proposed which focuses its meaning and relevance on motivation and the 
willingness to act in a manner required by an authority or institution. The chapter then 
takes a step towards developing a methodologically sound quantitative approach to 
assessing morale in an historical battle context. It makes use of a diverse range of new 
and underused sources, from archives across the Commonwealth, to quantitatively 
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assess on a weekly basis the morale of British Second Army in the Northwest Europe 
Campaign of the Second World War. The chapter demonstrates, for the first time, 
how, at least in the context of the British experience in Northwest Europe, morale can 
be accurately and robustly quantified over the course of a campaign. These conceptual 
and methodological innovations facilitate an in-depth analysis of the complex web of 
interrelationships that shape military performance. The findings point to the need to 
reevaluate the dominant theories on combat cohesion and put strategy, understood as 
an iterative multilevel process rather than a level of war or activity situated only as a 
bridge between national policy and tactics, at the heart of any understanding of 
combat cohesion.  
 
 
Combat Cohesion 
Much has been written on and around the subject of combat cohesion in the twentieth 
century.2 Anthony King’s recent study, The Combat Soldier, has built upon this 
literature and offered a reconceptualisation of cohesion and a reinterpretation of the 
factors that influence cohesive military performance. King defines cohesion as the 
‘successful coordination of actions on the battlefield’; it refers to the ability of 
soldiers ‘to act together and to achieve their mission in the face of the enemy’.3 Thus, 
King, like Sam C. Sarkesian,4 points to the connection between cohesion and 
successful or victorious military performance. This understanding of cohesion is 
subtly different to that propounded in other studies where cohesion incorporates a 
greater notion of efficiency.5 Allan R. Millet, Williamson Murray and Kenneth H. 
Watman argue that ‘judgments on effectiveness should retain some sense of 
proportional cost and organizational process’. In their view, the German army in the 
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Second World War was more cohesive than its enemies because it converted national 
resources into fighting power in a more efficient manner. The fact that Germany lost 
the war was irrelevant.6 
This chapter embraces the King definition of cohesion. While efficient 
military performance is certainly desirable, it is only one aspect of the far greater 
endeavour  of using military means in the pursuit of national policy. There is a real 
danger that military practitioners and scholars, by lauding the efficient performance of 
military organisations such as the Wehrmacht, lose sight of the purpose of war and the 
fundamental art that governs its use, strategy.   
In light of this understanding of cohesion, it is possible to identify three broad 
trends, or ‘metanarratives’, in the literature on cohesion in Western Armies in the 
twentieth century.7 The first, which can be referred to as the ‘brute force narrative’, 
stresses the importance of firepower and materiel to successful combat performance. 
In the First World War, these ideas were captured and expressed in the attritional 
warfare that developed on the western front. Sir John French, the British Commander-
in-Chief, wrote in January 1915 that 
 
Breaking through the enemy’s lines is largely a question of expenditure of high 
explosive ammunition. If sufficient ammunition is forthcoming, a way can be 
blasted through the line. If the attempt fails, it shows . . . that insufficient 
ammunition has been expended, i.e. either more guns must be brought up, or the 
allowance of ammunition per gun increased.8 
  
One of the more influential authors on the subject during and after the Second World 
War was S.L.A. Marshall. He contended that what was needed in battle was ‘more 
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and better fire’.9  He argued that ‘fundamentally fire wins wars and that every other 
aspect of operations is important only in the measure that it contributes to this grand 
object’.10  His ideas became dogma in the US Army, and there was, as Hew Strachan 
has pointed out, a clear trajectory from the publication of Men Against Fire to the 
performance of the US Army in the wars that followed, such as in Vietnam.11 In the 
decades following the Second World War, the ‘brute force narrative’ gained credence. 
Widely-read historical studies, by Max Hastings, John Ellis and Carlo D’Este, among 
others, stressed the material and technological underpinnings of successful combat 
performance:12   
 
In the broadest sense . . . it was economic might and productive capacity that 
determined the outcome of the Second World War. In the final analysis, once 
America and Russia had been drawn into the war and once each had blocked its 
opponents’ first mad rush, then there was absolutely no chance that the Axis 
powers could salvage even a negotiated peace . . . a Reich that would wage 
Blitzkrieg with only 47,000 tanks against its enemy’s 227,000, 116,000 guns 
against 915,000 and 350,000 trucks against 3,000,000, or a would-be maritime 
empire that aims to maintain its grasp by producing only 13 aircraft carriers against 
its opponent’s 137, has not much real chance of imposing its will.13 
 
More recently, a vein of scholarship has stressed the importance of conceptual factors 
in combat cohesion.14 These works have emphasised the influence of doctrine and 
tactics on effective combat performance. In fact, according to Stephen Biddle, the 
effects of technology and materiel are ‘secondary to force employment’.15 Biddle has 
presented evidence to suggest that one method in particular, the modern system 
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(based on cover, concealment, dispersion, suppression, combined arms and 
independent small-unit manoeuver at the tactical level and depth, reserves and 
differential concentration at the operational level),16 ‘broke the trench stalemate in 
1918 and defined the standard for successful military operations throughout the post-
1918 era’.17 The ‘tactics narrative’ does not reject the significance of material and 
technological preponderance, but argues that victory and defeat result from the way 
material and technology are employed on the battlefield. This approach to 
understanding cohesion places a considerable weight on the institutions and 
individuals whose responsibility it is to intellectualise, imagine and resolve the 
problems of battle performance. 
Anthony King has outlined a third approach to understanding combat 
cohesion, a ‘morale narrative’. King argues, building on the work of authors such as 
Ardant du Picq, John Baynes and John Keegan, that in the context of mass conscript 
armies in the twentieth century, tactics (usually enshrined in doctrine) were not 
central to successful combat performance. Although ‘western powers had developed 
refined infantry doctrine’, their platoons were ‘normally unable to execute [it] in 
combat, despite expectations that they would do so’. This was due to the fact that ‘the 
vast majority of infantry was poorly trained’. In the absence of adequate training, 
success in battle was the product of a ‘mass-individual dialectic’ aided by supporting 
fire and, above all, artillery. Either the highly motivated group charged the enemy or 
the highly motivated individual (usually an officer or N.C.O.) assaulted the enemy for 
the group. Success or failure was, therefore, contingent on the willingness of the 
soldier to close with and kill, wound or capture the enemy. Success was dependent on 
morale.18 
	   7	  
The ‘morale narrative’ also recognises the significance of materiel in war. It 
emphasises the role played by massed firepower in suppressing enemy resistance to 
allow attacking forces to cross the fireswept zone. It constitutes, in many ways, an 
important counterpoint to the dominant approach of historians and social scientists 
interested in the study of war. It builds on a ‘Tolstoyan’ understanding of combat (or 
history for that matter), that battles (events) are not merely the execution of a 
general’s or leader’s concept, but rather the product of ‘the grubby actions of small 
groups of men, often confused and frightened’.19 However, unlike the ‘brute force’ 
and ‘tactics’ narratives, the ‘morale narrative’ has received little ‘theoretical 
attention’.20 This may be because any study of morale faces somewhat unique 
conceptual and methodological problems in that scholars and military practitioners 
struggle to agree on a workable definition of morale or a way to meaningfully 
measure it. These shortcomings have potentially profound implications for the study 
of combat cohesion. First, as Michael Handell has argued, there is a danger that 
historians, social scientists and military practitioners ‘focus on that which can be 
measured’ and ignore ‘the critical but more elusive factor of will’.21 Second, 
assessments of morale based on too little evidence can misrepresent patterns of events 
and skew understanding of the past, with serious implications for present and future 
decision-making.  
 
Defining Morale 
A number of definitions of the term morale have been proposed in the literature. 
Robert Guion, Reuvan Gal and Frederick Manning, Stephan Motowidlo et al. and 
Thomas Britt and James Dickinson have broadly claimed that morale refers to various 
affective states, such as contentment and happiness, and group dynamics.22 Although 
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not without foundation, there are major problems with approaches that identify 
affective states and/or group dynamics as central to morale. Specifically, there is 
much evidence to suggest that troops can experience positive affective states while 
also behaving in manners that are completely contrary to the interests of the military 
establishment. For instance, a combatant might feel ‘happy’, ‘satisfied’ or ‘optimistic’ 
due to the fact that he has run away and is now safe from harm. Similarly, as Chiara 
Ruffa’s chapter illustrates, strong group bonds and ‘high morale’ can undermine 
positive military performance, where e.g. a soldier might stop to aid a wounded 
comrade in spite of orders to press the attack.23 At the same time, group desertions 
and mutiny can evidence small group bonds, yet they are clearly actions contrary to 
the needs of the military institution.24 For instance, in Vietnam, the importance of 
group survival often outweighed the need to complete assigned tasks.25 Definitions of 
morale based on affective states or group dynamics can lead, therefore, to the 
paradox, demonstrated in all these cases, of high morale leading directly to poor 
military performance. 
Motivation is a further aspect of morale that requires consideration, but it is 
important to stress that motivation does not require the individual or group to be 
positive (or enthusiastic, as Britt and Dickinson suggest) about assigned objectives. 
Combatants can be highly motivated to carry out tasks that they don’t necessarily 
want to engage with, that they are not hopeful, optimistic or confident will succeed, 
due to the fact that they are disciplined or even coerced into action. As John Keegan 
has pointed out,  
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“Kill or be killed” is the logic of battle – to which military law adds the rider, 
“Risk being killed by the enemy or else risk being killed by your own provost-
marshal”. 26 
 
This coercive dynamic (or ‘negative’ motivation), Keegan claims, has been present in 
warfare throughout the ages.27 Soldiers have to accept ‘the basic philosophy 
governing human relationships within an army’,28 said S.L.A. Marshall, or take what 
Samuel A. Stouffer et al referred to as ‘the institutionally sanctioned consequences’.29 
Brigadier A.B. McPherson, who, in 1950, compiled the British War Office 
monograph on discipline, wrote that ‘in the inculcation of “morale” discipline is an 
indispensable factor. Self-respect, self-control and obedience to authority, which go 
hand in hand in training in discipline, are sturdy elements also in the foundation of 
morale’.30 
There is evidence, then, to suggest that military professionals link morale 
closely with motivation but explicitly distance it from associations with positive 
affective states or the group. For example, General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, in 
a paper he wrote on the subject in April 1946, defined morale as ‘endurance and 
courage in supporting fatigue and danger . . . the quality which makes men go forward 
in an attack and hold their ground in defence’.31 He stated categorically that high 
morale ‘is not contentment or satisfaction’ or ‘happiness’. Happiness, according to 
Montgomery, ‘may be a contributory factor in the maintenance of morale over a long 
period, but it is no more than that. A man can be unhappy but can still, regularly and 
without complaining, advance and defend’.32 He saw group dynamics in very much 
the same light.33 Morale, according to Montgomery, is clearly like an overall 
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causative influence on a soldier's conduct; indeed some psychologists use the term 
'motivation’ in similar contexts.34 
Following the broad thrust of Montgomery’s approach, morale is here defined 
as the willingness of an individual or group to engage in an action required by an 
authority or institution; this willingness may be engendered by a positive desire for 
action and/or by the discipline to accept orders to take such action. The degree of 
morale of an individual or group relates to the extent of their willingness or discipline 
to act, or their determination to see an action through. This is the broad approach to 
the conceptualisation of morale that is taken in this chapter. This definition does not 
conflate morale with emotion or interpersonal loyalty, although it excludes neither as 
potential sources of motivation. Instead it recognises that military institutions require 
their personnel, first and foremost, to be willing to carry out orders. If troops are 
willing to carry out orders, any military organisation will have a chance of success 
irrespective of the mood of their men and women or the strength of primary group 
bonds.35 Indeed, as King discusses in his chapter on discipline, it seems almost certain 
that the severe even fanatical discipline of the Wehrmacht positively encouraged 
German soldiers to fight, even though they can scarcely have been happy about the 
sanctions with which they were constantly threatened.  
 
Assessment of Morale 
There are relatively few reliable primary or secondary sources that assess levels of 
morale in armies. Those that do, such as the works of Morris Janowitz and Edward 
Shils, S.L.A. Marshall and Samuel A. Stouffer et. al. in the Second World War and 
Leonard Wong et. al. in the 2003 Iraq War, make extensive use of contemporaneously 
recorded attitudinal surveys. These studies typically link morale with motivation, for 
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example, S.L.A. Marshall contended that morale had ‘no meaning’ unless it was 
understood as ‘the body of thought’ that ‘disposes the thinker to high endeavor or 
toward failure’,36 while Wong et. al. explicity engaged with the problem of ‘combat 
motivation’.37 Nevertheless, these studies are sufficiently wide ranging that they can 
also be used to asses morale as a positive affective state or aspect of group dynamics. 
They provide scholars with valuable attitudinal information for military organisations 
at particular places and periods of time. However, their findings are often highly 
contextualised; their relevance, therefore, to other combatant nations, wars and 
environments must be understood in this light.  
In the majority of cases where attitudinal surveys have not taken place, 
scholars attempting to assess morale are typically dependent on sources such as 
personal recollections and memoirs. These sources use varying conceptualisations of 
morale and also suffer from serious methodological shortcomings, not least the 
fallibility of individuals’ memories, especially where interviews take place decades 
after the event, and the impact of prevailing cultural and social interpretations of the 
meaning of events on the recollections of historical actors. Contemporaneously 
recorded diaries or letters are more reliable as historical sources, but, again, they lack 
consistent definitional clarity and it is often difficult to amass a representative sample 
of such sources for an army. Recent studies, such as Alexander Watson’s Enduring 
the Great War, this author’s Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign and 
Jonathan Boff’s Winning and Losing on the Western Front have tried to circumvent 
this problem by making use of newly discovered or underused official sources, such 
as censorship summaries of soldiers’ mail and morale reports.38 Such sources cover 
morale widely and deeply and tend to express views that represent a considerable 
body of opinion among troops. They are so extensive and detailed that the appropriate 
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definitional focus can relatively easily be mined within them. However, again, these 
sources are available in only a minority of cases, and, thus, may be limited as a tool to 
assess morale in armies across the twentieth century. 
In addition to the use of attitudinal surveys, combatant letters and diaries, 
censorship summaries and morale reports, military professionals (particularly 
commanders and medical officers), theorists and scholars have also used rates of 
sickness, battle exhaustion, desertion, absence without leave (AWOL) and self-
inflicted wounds (SIW) in units as a useful proxy for morale. These metrics do not 
assess morale as an affective state or as an aspect of group dynamics but accurately, 
albeit indirectly, assess the willingness of troops to engage in actions required by the 
authority or institution. In this regard, the functional definition used here not only 
clarifies the meaning of morale but also facilitates its measurement. Militaries tend to 
record and keep this kind of data, and, therefore, this method may prove generally 
useful to assess morale across armies and across time periods. Historians of the 
British and Commonwealth Armies in the Second World War have been particularly 
proactive in utilising these sources as a tool to assess morale. Indeed, both David 
French and John Buckley have used battle exhaustion, desertion, AWOL and SIW 
statistics to argue that perceptions of weakness in British morale in the Normandy 
campaign have been misplaced and misguided.39 This author has also used sickness, 
battle exhaustion, desertion and AWOL and surrender statistics to plot a morale crisis 
and recovery in Eighth Army in the North African campaign in 1942.40  
There is a significant body of contemporaneous evidence that confirms the use 
of this approach in the assessment of morale. F.A.E. Crew, the Official Historian of 
the British Army Medical Services in the Northwest Europe campaign of the Second 
World War, wrote that sickness in the campaign had been kept low in no small 
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measure due to morale. The fact that the campaign had lasted less than a year, been 
‘filled with victory’ and that ‘no deepening gloom born of disaster’ had set in played a 
role.41 Montgomery, the Commander of 21st Army Group, of which Second Army 
was a part, was emphatic that the ‘truly remarkable success of the medical 
organisation’ in Northwest Europe had been built upon two factors: the quality of the 
manpower available and the morale of the Army. Montgomery noted the ‘exhilarating 
effect of success’ on ‘reducing the rates of sickness’ in Second Army. It was quite 
clear to him that ‘the medical state’ of the army had not been ‘dependent on the 
doctors alone’. Their efforts had been ‘immeasurably facilitated when morale’ had 
been ‘at its highest’.42 
The number of battle exhaustion cases in a unit was also seen as an accurate 
indicator of morale. Major D.J. Watterson, the psychiatrist attached to Second Army 
in Normandy, wrote in his report for June 1944 that the number of exhaustion cases in 
a unit was an excellent ‘index to that unit’s quality of men and of its wellbeing and 
morale’. In fact, he said, ‘it is as good a guide to the unit’s state of mental health as is 
the temperature chart in a case of fever’.43 A similar view was present in the Canadian 
Army. Major R.A. Gregory, Neuro-psychiatrist to 3 Canadian Infantry Division, 
wrote during the battle of the Scheldt in October 1944 that ‘there was one thing of 
note among all troops admitted for exhaustion, [that is] lack of morale or lack of 
volition to carry on’. The psychiatrist’s work, he wrote, ‘is first to advise on things 
which tend to lower morale and increase the incidence [of] exhaustion’.44 
According to F.A.E. Crew, there was a close association between battle 
exhaustion and certain military crimes, such as desertion, AWOL and SIW.45 In fact, 
he argued that these issues could be viewed as two sides of the same coin. ‘Whereas 
some men went sick and were evacuated, others suffering from much the same 
	   14	  
condition ran away, were charged and awarded penal servitude. The psychological 
escape of the former and the physical escape of the latter were expressions of the 
same mechanism’.46 A report produced in June 1945 on ‘“Soldiers Under Sentence” 
for Such Offences as Desertion, Cowardice, Mutiny etc., Whose Cases Have Been 
Reviewed in British Second Army’ lends support to this contention.47 During the 
period 17 November 1944 to 22 January 1945, 596 men who had committed offences 
in June, July and August 1944 and served three months of their sentences were 
interviewed with the intention of ascertaining their suitability for further service in the 
Army. The ‘great majority of the prisoners’ were found to be ‘good personality types, 
only too anxious to be given the opportunity to redeem their characters’. Their crimes 
were, according to the report, ‘in a large majority of cases not premeditated, but 
occurred on the “spur of the moment” when under great stress’. The men gave a 
number of reasons for their behaviour, most of which are known influences on morale 
in battle: 
 
‘“I was browned off at the time”, “I was very tired, we got no sleep”, “I was worried 
about bad news from home” . . . Resentment at being transferred to infantry after 
long service in other arms of the service was often evident. Here . . . the plea put 
forward as an excuse for behaviour was “lack of training” and in many cases . . . 
recent reinforcements . . . had obviously not been long enough with their units to 
develop that group spirit and friendship which is the best bond to security.  
 
It is conceivable, of course, that the inmates were telling the military authorities what 
they wanted to hear. Nevertheless, the conclusions of the report are supporteded by 
evidence from other theatres during the war and the behaviour of the men themselves 
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once they returned to combat.48 Of the 596 men who had their cases reviewed, 435, or 
73 per cent, were returned to full duties in the line.49 By the end of the war, these men 
had seen a number of months of active duty, the majority taking part in the 
Reichswald Forest battle, which, according to the report, was ‘more grim’ than the 
period in which the men had committed their offences. Overall, almost three quarters 
of the men returned to full duties in the line gave satisfactory and meaningful military 
service. The report concluded that ‘the percentage of “real bad eggs” has been small’ 
and that ‘the outstanding impression gained’ was ‘the great similarity there exists 
between many of the cases reviewed and those that are referred through medical 
channels for psychiatric opinion’. The ‘natural conclusion’ to be made from this study 
was, therefore, ‘that the majority of deserters’ were not ‘true cowards’, and, in fact, 
that issues relating to morale, just as in cases of battle exhaustion, had been the key 
driver in the soldiers’ behaviour.50  
Morale, according to Q.V.B. Wallace, the Deputy Director of Medical 
Services 1 Corps, Second Army, was also central to keeping instances of SIW in an 
army at a low level. He wrote that the welfare of the soldier, leave, the provision of 
newspapers, the speed of delivery of letters etc. had all ‘been much more thoroughly 
planned for’ in Northwest Europe and this ‘had a very obvious effect on morale’, 
which, in turn, affected SIW.51 Lieutenant-Colonel A.T.A. Browne, who was given 
the task of investigating the causes of SIW during the Normandy campaign, painted a 
very similar picture. He argued that SIW were the product of the interplay of five 
factors: 1) The cultural and social conditions prevalent at the time; 2) The appalling 
physical conditions experienced on the battlefields of Normandy; 3) The heavy 
casualties; 4) Poor quality training and manpower selection; 5) The need for rest and 
recuperation.52 All of these factors were key influences on morale.53 
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Thus, an examination of historical sources suggests that morale affects and is 
affected by rates of sickness, battle exhaustion, desertion, AWOL and SIW. It may 
additionally be suggested that the relationship between these factors is so close that a 
knowledge of rates of sickness, battle exhaustion, desertion, AWOL and SIW can  
provide a useful indicator of the levels of morale at different stages of a campaign. 
The extent and strength of these associations may be  explored by use of quantitative 
approaches. This requires a systematic assessment of available primary sources, such 
as censorship summaries of soldiers’ mail, to describe and ‘quantify’ levels of morale 
(through the use of a numerical morale scale) as well as the tabulation of rates of 
sickness, battle exhaustion, desertion, AWOL and SIW. If the tabulated rates are 
indeed indicators of morale, they should, broadly speaking, fluctuate along the lines 
of the shifts in morale levels as encapsulated in the morale scale.  
 
Quantitative Assessment of Morale 
In order to carry out this quantitative assessment, the case of British Second Army in 
the Northwest Europe Campaign of the Second World War was explored. Thirty-six 
bi-weekly censorship summaries, covering the period between 4 April 1944 and 15 
October 1945, were found at Library and Archives Canada and the Directorate of 
History and Heritage, Ottawa. These summaries were compiled from 1,494,479 letters 
sent by officers, NCOs and other ranks in the British Army and have never before, as 
far as this author is aware, been used in an historical study. These summaries proved a 
most useful source for the building of the morale scale. Each summary was based on 
the censorship of an average of over 40,000 letters, and, thus, gave a reliable appraisal 
of changes in morale in Second Army. A typical modern national opinion survey uses 
a sample of 1,100 to give an error margin of ±3 percent; if a similar methodology 
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were used on a sample of 40,000, the error would be tiny (±0.5 percent). The 
censorship reports used a fairly consistent language and usually described the level of 
morale in a summary at the start. In order to turn a qualitative assessment of morale 
into a scale, all typical descriptions of morale were first graded from the ‘best’ to the 
‘worst’ morale, taking into account the definitional approach being used here. The 
different descriptions were then put in categories of meaning that were as far as 
possible of equal intervals apart. Then each description of morale was given a score. 
Where morale was described as ‘excellent’, it was awarded a score of 3. ‘High’ 
morale was given a score of 2 and ‘good’ morale was scored 1. ‘Satisfactory’ morale 
was given a score of 0 (neither positive or negative). Morale described as ‘severely 
tried’ was scored -1, while ‘low’ and ‘very low’ morale were scored -2 and -3 
respectively.54 
Statistics relating to weekly levels of sickness, battle exhaustion and SIW 
were found in the War Diaries of the Deputy Director of Medical Services, Second 
Army.55 The War Diaries reported sick admissions per 1,000 per week (which also 
included battle exhaustion cases) in the ‘Weekly Hygiene Reports’ for Second Army 
and the incidence of battle exhaustion per 1,000 for each weekly period in the 
‘Monthly Hygiene Reports’ for Second Army.56 The number of battle exhaustion 
cases was calculated by applying the battle exhaustion rate per 1,000 to the strength of 
Second Army (which was provided in each ‘Weekly Hygiene Report’). The overall 
weekly sick number was also computed in this manner. By then subtracting the 
weekly battle exhaustion number from the overall weekly sick number, thus obtained,  
it was possible to calculate the true sick number (i.e. without battle exhaustion). The 
weekly figures for SIW were outlined in a ‘Report on Surgery in Second Army in the 
Northwest Europe Campaign, 1944-45’.57 Monthly convictions by Courts Martial for 
	   18	  
desertion and AWOL were recorded in the ‘Administrative History of 21st Army 
Group’ and in the War Diaries of the Deputy Judge Advocate General, 21st Army 
Group.58 While some of these figures have been presented before,59 this chapter 
offers, for the first time, as far as this author is aware, a comprehensive picture of the 
number of sick, battle exhaustion, desertion and AWOL and SIW in Second Army 
during the Northwest Europe campaign of the Second World War (see Tables 8.1 and 
8.2). 
 
Table 8.1: Strength of the Fighting Portion of Second Army plus Weekly Admissions 
for Casualties (Cas)*, Sick, Battle Exhaustion (BE) and Self-Inflicted Wounds (SIW), 
6 June 1944 to 26 May 1945.60 
Week Ending Strength Cas Sick BE SIW Week Ending Strength Cas Sick BE SIW 
6-10 Jun-44  5,259^    09-Dec-44 268,000 590 2,007 54 3 
17-Jun-44 217,437 7,194 1,155 563 16 16-Dec-44 261,000 287 1,976 21 6 
24-Jun-44 294,393 2,554 1,027 365 18 23-Dec-44 286,000 474 1,599 34 2 
01-Jul-44 355,000 6,020 2,329 925 18 30-Dec-44 297,000 471 1,719 39 6 
08-Jul-44 424,922 3,739 2,855 999 30 06-Jan-45 304,000 907 2,290 73 8 
15-Jul-44 399,003 4,225 2,131 1,365 31 13-Jan-45 299,000 993 2,805 72 6 
22-Jul-44 421,576 6,615 6,281 2,373 28 20-Jan-45 299,000 742 2,177 54 5 
29-Jul-44 343,839 2,670 2,225 622 20 27-Jan-45 210,000 945 1,889 92 8 
05-Aug-44 296,000 3,968 2,717 681 19 03-Feb-45 175,000 269 1,562 9 4 
12-Aug-44 274,000 5,173 1,984 923 21 10-Feb-45 166,000 234 1,264 27 1 
19-Aug-44 238,000 1,730 2,468 231 8 17-Feb-45 130,000 194 1,267 29 1 
26-Aug-44 221,190 492 1,803 53 5 24-Feb-45 102,000 86 883 26 0 
02-Sep-44 234,000 893 1,114 87 3 03-Mar-45 101,000 110 816 20 3 
09-Sep-44 244,000 1,419 686 39 2 10-Mar-45 228,000 883 1,913 82 1 
16-Sep-44 245,000 1,220 1,186 186 5 17-Mar-45 300,000 469 1,900 15 0 
23-Sep-44 250,000 2,005 933 190 3 24-Mar-45 346,000 1,314 1,597 69 0 
30-Sep-44 255,000 1,554 1,760 260 4 31-Mar-45 316,000 5,124 2,473 411 13 
07-Oct-44 290,000 1,599 1,717 165 3 07-Apr-45 325,000 2,657 1,577 156 11 
14-Oct-44 274,000 876 1,540 219 3 14-Apr-45 356,000 2,214 1,751 125 9 
21-Oct-44 265,000 1,496 1,582 334 5 21-Apr-45 357,000 2,360 2,289 136 6 
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28-Oct-44 303,000 1,616 2,018 182 1 28-Apr-45 357,000 1,469 2,366 143 9 
04-Nov-44 268,000 1,956 1,729 295 8 05-May-45 373,000 1,522 2,355 112 18 
11-Nov-44 269,000 1,092 1,552 108 16 12-May-45 401,000 714 2,327 20 6 
18-Nov-44 275,000 1,232 1,601 96 2 19-May-45 347,000 479 2,461 7 1 
25-Nov-44 262,000 1,534 2,261 128 2 26-May-45 311,000 303 1,473 0 0 
02-Dec-44 266,000 931 1,819 82 0       
* This includes all casualties admitted for reasons of battle wounds, battle accidents and burns (but 
does not include killed and captured). 
^ Admissions to medical units were not classified during this period. Thus, it is probable that this figure 
includes sick and battle exhaustion. 
 
Table 8.2: Number of Conviction by Courts Martial for Desertion and AWOL, 
Second Army, July 1944 to April 1945.61 
Month Desertion Absence Total 
July 1944 141* 96* 237 
August 1944 393* 82* 475 
September 1944 303 169 472 
October 1944 343 143 486 
November 1944 353 304 657 
December 1944 380 261 641 
January 1945 321 353 674 
February 1945 310 327 637 
March 1945 451 333 784 
April 1945 410 264 674 
* Figures for 103 and 105 Reinforcement Groups have been excluded as they were situated in the UK 
at this time.62 
As Courts Martial usually tried cases in arrears, it is assumed that cases tried in each month refer to 
crimes committed in the preceding month. 
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This detailed presentation of the facts should allow, through the use of a correlation 
analysis, a clearer picture to be formed of the relationship between morale and those 
factors historically associated with it.63 The available statistics for desertion and 
AWOL, which were presented in a monthly fashion, could not be meaningfully 
broken down into bi-weekly figures (to be correlated with biweekly reported morale 
levels contained in the censorship summaries). Thus, it was decided to carry out the 
analysis on the 11 monthly periods of the Northwest Europe Campaign, June 1944 to 
April 1945.64 The two biweekly censorship summaries in every month had, therefore, 
to be combined to create a morale score for each month as a whole (see Table 8.4). In 
cases where the censorship summaries described different levels of morale in the first 
and second half of a month, a best effort was made to find a balanced score taking 
fully into account the complexity of the issues addressed in both summaries. In many 
cases, this decision was not overly problematic. For example, it was sensible in 
instances where morale was described as ‘good’ (scored 1) in one half of the month 
and ‘excellent’ (scored 3) in the other half of the month to record an overall morale 
score of 2 (or ‘high’). The sick, battle exhaustion and SIW figures, recorded on a 
weekly basis, had also to be added together to produce monthly statistics.65 The 
absolute figures for each month were reconverted into rates per 1,000 by taking an 
average from the size of army statistics contained in each ‘Weekly Hygiene Report’ 
(see Table 8.3); this ensured that the varying size of the army at different times did 
not distort the relationships. The rates for each category were then combined to 
produce a composite measure that could be correlated with the morale scale (see 
total/1,000 in Table 8.3). 
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Table 8.3: Monthly Sick, Battle Exhaustion (BE), Desertion/AWOL and SIW Rates 
per 1,000 in Second Army, June 1944 to April 1945. 
* Includes AWOL. As Courts Martial usually tried cases in arrears, the figures for each month are 
based on the Courts Martial from the following month, i.e. the figure for July 1944 is derived from the 
number of Courts Martial carried out in August 1944. 
** Does not include desertion/AWOL 
 
Table 8.4: Morale Descriptions and Scores Based on the Censorship Summaries, 
Second Army, June 1944 to April 1945. 
Month Sick/1,000 BE/1,000 Desertion*/1,000 SIW/1,000 Total/1000 
Jun 1944 14.42 5.96 0.82 0.18 21.39 
Jul 1944 36.99 14.22 1.20 0.30 52.72 
Aug 1944 35.72 6.49 1.87 0.19 44.26 
Sep 1944 19.64 2.81 1.96 0.06 24.46 
Oct 1944 26.93 3.70 2.32 0.06 33.01 
Nov 1944 28.79 2.09 2.39 0.09 33.36 
Dec 1944 29.31 0.65 2.42 0.07 32.45 
Jan 1945 36.12 1.09 2.29 0.11 39.62 
Feb 1945 33.70 0.77 2.82 0.04 37.32 
Mar 1945 30.75 2.00 2.61 0.06 35.41 
Apr 1945 22.80 1.70 Not available 0.11 24.61** 
Month Morale Description Morale Score 
June 1944 ‘Excellent’ 3 
July 1944 ‘Good’ 1 
August 1944 ‘Good’ 1 
September 1944 ‘Excellent’ 3 
October 1944 ‘High’ 2 
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The results of the correlation analysis showed that the composite measure (the 
combined rate of sickness, battle exhaustion, desertion, AWOL and SIW) had an 
extremely strong negative correlation with morale (-0.949, P<0.001). This is a 
remarkably strong relationship and shows that these factors when taken together can 
be used as a quantitative method to assess levels of morale, at the very least for the 
Army and campaign under discussion. Coincidently, it offers a quantitative 
justification of the approach used by this author in Combat and Morale in the North 
African Campaign. Of some interest also is the finding that of the factors taken singly, 
sickness had by far the strongest negative correlation with morale (-0.875, P<0.001).66 
 
In Search of a Theory to Explain Combat Cohesion: The Case of British Second 
Army in Northwest Europe 
Thus, the evidence suggests, that for Second Army, at this time, in the conditions 
prevalent in Northwest Europe, morale can be assessed quantitatively. This 
methodological innovation makes it possible, using figures for sickness, battle 
exhaustion, desertion, AWOL and SIW in Second Army to assess and graph levels of 
morale during the campaign on a monthly basis (see Figure 8.1). 
 
November 1944 ‘High’ 2 
December 1944 ‘High’ 2 
January 1945 ‘High’ 2 
February 1945 ‘High’ 2 
March 1945 ‘High’ 2 
April 1945 ‘Excellent’ 3 
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Figure 8.1: Second Army, Monthly Admissions per 1,000 to General Hospitals and 
Casualty Clearing Stations for Sickness, Battle Exhaustion (BE), Desertion, AWOL 
and SIW as Compared to the Morale Score Derived from the Censorship Summaries, 
June 1944 to April 1945.67 
 
 
As one would expect from the high level of correlation, Figure 8.1 shows that the 
tabulated figures for sickness, battle exhaustion, desertion, AWOL and SIW coincide 
with the morale scale presented in Table 8.4, with the exception of July 1944, and, to 
a lesser extent, January and February 1945. In fact, it is suggested that where there is 
a discrepancy between the tabulated figures and the morale scale, the tabulated figures 
should be used. The bi-weekly censorship summaries, although an excellent source, 
are sometimes limited in their utility as a measure of morale due to the fact that they 
occasionally omit mail from key units during critical phases of the campaign. For 
example, the summary for 16 to 31 July 1944 did not assess mail from the main 
assault divisions (Guards Armoured Division, 7th Armoured Division and 11th 
Armoured division) during Operation Goodwood, the key battle during the report 
period.68 In fact, only 326 of the 27,366 letters assessed in this bi-weekly summary 
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came from these units. The tabulated figures include sick, battle exhaustion, desertion, 
AWOL and SIW for all units during all phases of the campaign. Furthermore, by 
assessing these factors together, they render irrelevant reporting irregularities such as 
the fact that units often classified similar battle behaviours in very different manners 
(for example some units classified breakdowns in battle as exhaustion while others 
classified them as military crimes, such as desertion). Thus, it can be argued that the 
tabulated figures capture fluctuations in morale even more accurately than the morale 
scale derived from the censorship summaries.  
The picture of morale that emerges from the tabulated figures shows clearly 
that, for most of the Northwest Europe Campaign, morale in Second Army was either 
high or excellent, as indeed one would expect during a successful period of fighting. 
In fact, morale appears to have been lower only during the static and arguably less 
successful fighting in Normandy, in July and August 1944. This can add considerably 
to our understanding of the Normandy campaign and the impact of morale on combat 
cohesion more generally. Much has been written on the state of morale in Second 
Army during this period, and, while an army with satisfactory morale can hardly be 
described as in crisis, this assessment of morale may go some way to explain Second 
Army’s less than spectacular performance in the critical battles around Caen and 
Falaise in the summer of 1944.  
To understand the role of morale in combat cohesion in Second Army in 
Northwest Europe better, however, an even more granular picture can be compiled 
(see Figure 8.2) by presenting weekly fluctuations in the rates of sickness, battle 
exhaustion and SIW (weekly figures for desertion and AWOL are not available). 
These factors taken together have almost as strong a negative correlation with morale 
(-0.936, P<0.001) as the total tabulated figures presented in Table 8.3. 
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Figure 8.2: Second Army, Weekly Admissions per 1,000 to General Hospitals and 
Casualty Clearing Stations for Sickness, Battle Exhaustion and SIW, 11 June 1944 to 
5 May 1945. Morale scale equivalents are presented on the right hand Y-axis.69 
 
Figure 8.2 shows that while morale was, on the whole, high to excellent for much of 
the campaign, it did dip at some critical moments in July and November 1944 and 
January and February 1945. It could barely be described as ‘good’ during operations 
in the first half of August 1944, notably during Operation Bluecoat and the attempt to 
close the Falaise pocket, and was seriously problematic on one occasion – during 
Operation Goodwood in July 1944.  
Indeed, the graphical analysis of morale presented in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 
supports the conclusions of much of the recent historiography on the British Army in 
Northwest Europe; morale was a necessary component of combat cohesion (morale in 
Second Army was broadly speaking high throughout the victorious campaign); 
however, morale was not a sufficient explanation for Second Army’s successes and 
failures on the battlefield.70 For example, morale would appear to have been at its 
highest before and during Operation Market Garden. But Market Garden was a 
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failure. It is likely, as John Buckley has argued, that Market Garden was a conceptual 
failure rather than a morale one.71 Morale would also appear to have been mostly high 
during operations in the Low Countries and Germany, but these operations were beset 
with setbacks and delays.  
In fact, one of the key advantages of the quantitative assessment of morale 
presented in this chapter may be that it allows the relationship between levels of 
morale and combat cohesion to be quantitatively evaluated. Because the ‘Colossal 
Cracks’ operational approach employed by Second Army was essentially attrition 
based,72 an assessment of German casualties would be an excellent proxy for combat 
effectiveness. However, while such figures are available in ten day periods for the 
German Army as a whole, they do not differentiate between casualties inflicted by 
Allied nationality e.g. British, Canadian or American, making an accurate assessment 
of Second Army’s effectiveness on this basis problematic. As the number of enemy 
prisoners captured by Second Army per week is available, it may be used as a crude 
but useful alternative proxy for combat success or cohesion. As can be seen in Figure 
8.3, there is a weak negative correlation (-0.236, P=0.179) between the level of 
morale in each week of the campaign (assessed by using figures for sickness, battle 
exhaustion and SIW) and the number of enemy prisoners captured per week. Insofar, 
therefore, as the number of prisoners captured might indicate combat success, this 
success is only weakly associated with the strength of morale in Second Army.  
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Figure 8.3: Second Army, Rate of Sick, Battle Exhaustion and SIW per 1,000 and 
Number of Prisoners Captured per Week.73 
 
 
The empirical evidence presented in Figures 8.2 and 8.3 may have 
implications for our understanding of combat cohesion in the Twentieth Century. It 
clearly indicates that the ‘morale narrative’, as outlined by King, may, while correctly 
emphasising the important role of morale in combat cohesion, tend to overestimate 
that importance to the exclusion of other key factors. 
Additionally, any suggestion that Second Army’s combat performance was the 
product primarily of the application of overwhelming firepower (the ‘brute force 
narrative’) appears to be undermined also by the available evidence. Army 
Operational Research Group Memorandum No. E20, ‘Some Statistics on the North 
West Europe Campaign’, clearly states that there ‘was no significant correlation 
between German casualties and either Allied [Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group and 
US 12th Army Group] casualties or Allied ammunition expenditure’.74 Furthermore, 
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Figure 8.4 demonstrates that there was not a strong relationship (-0.234, P=0.179) 
between the firepower employed by 21 Army Group, of which Second Army was a 
key component, and the area of ground captured from the enemy (again, a crude but 
useful proxy for combat success). In fact, there was a similarly weak correlation (-
0.160, P=0.445) between the firepower employed by 21 Army Group and the number 
of enemy prisoners captured.75  
 
Figure 8.4: 21st Army Group, Area of Advance in 10 Day Periods to Ammunition 
Expended (1 July 1944 to 28 March 1945).76 
 
Furthermore, any suggestion that the performance of Second Army was driven 
primarily by conceptual considerations (the ‘tactics narrative’) appears to be ill 
founded. David French, Stephen Hart and Stephen Biddle have all argued that 
Montgomery employed a systematic, or even formulaic, approach to battle in the 
Northwest Europe campaign.77 Indeed, by 1944, Montgomery had devised an 
operational approach that gave the British Army the best chance possible to tackle the 
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Wehrmacht in battle. As John Buckley has argued, Montgomery’s ‘greatest 
achievement’ was ‘correctly adopting an operational approach that emphasized 
British strengths (firepower, planning, logistics and intelligence) and avoided 
weaknesses (close-combat tactics and manoeuvre)’.78 However, both theoretically and 
practically, there are limits to the effectiveness of systemic approaches to battle. Both 
Buckley and Copp have argued that by 1944, German tactics had become so 
predictable that the Allies were able to devise their own strategies around them. The 
same can be said for the British approach. By 1944, the Germans were fully aware, 
for example, that the direction of creeping barrages indicated the thrust lines of 
impending advances. This made it easy for the Wehrmacht to place reserves at the 
decisive point at the key moment.  Normandy did not go exactly according to plan; no 
military plan ever survives first contact with the enemy unchanged.79 In fact, as 
Buckley and Copp have intimated, the Northwest Europe campaign was characterised 
far more by adaptation and innovation than heretofore recognised.80 It can be argued, 
therefore, that British success was not built primarily on an operational, or conceptual, 
approach to the problem (however much this may have helped), but rather on the 
ability of individuals (including Montgomery) and units at every level of the military 
organisation to balance the available means (be they material, tactical or morale) with 
the objectives and ends at hand, as indeed they did over the course of the successful 
campaign. This interactive, dynamic process required a nuanced, flexible and strategic 
approach to combat cohesion.  
 
Combat Cohesion and Strategy 
Further consideration, therefore, of the relationship between cohesion and strategy 
may shed light on the issue. According to Clausewitz, ‘war is an act of force to 
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compel our enemy to do our will’.81  This statement suggests that, more often than 
not, belligerents fight for a goal, or an end, that they try to achieve or impose upon an 
enemy. That goal does not have to be rational or particularly well thought out; it can 
be driven by reason, passion, hatred and pure chance. Nevertheless, the challenge of 
devising a successful strategy to achieve a goal dominates military theory and 
practice. Indeed strategy was the central and unifying theme of Clausewitz’s On 
War.82 
Clausewitz defined strategy as the ‘use of the engagement for the purpose of the 
war’.83 More recently, Colin Gray defined strategy as ‘the use that is made of force 
and the threat of force for the ends of policy’,84 while Liddell Hart described strategy 
as ‘the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy’.85 
Thus, it appears clear that the relationship between military means and policy 
objectives (or ends) is at the heart of the strategic process.86 Military decision makers 
have constantly to align their means to coincide with policy; vice versa, policy makers 
have to create policy in line with the available means. As Strachan puts it 
 
In the ideal model of civil–military relations, the democratic head of state sets out 
his or her policy, and armed forces coordinate the means to enable its achievement. 
The reality is that this process – a process called strategy – is iterative, a dialogue 
where ends also reflect means, and where the result – also called strategy – is a 
compromise between the ends of policy and the military means available to 
implement it.87 
 
To achieve policy by use of violent means, a belligerent has typically to match his 
effort against what Clausewitz referred to as an enemy’s ‘power of resistance’. This 
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he expressed as ‘the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his 
disposal and the strength of his will’.88 To put it another way, all belligerents in a 
conflict engage with strategy and attempt to balance ends with means. Military means 
are a product of the interplay between the material capability to fight and the will to 
fight (morale, as defined above).89 When a belligerent can no longer continue to fight, 
because their material strength has been whittled away through attrition, or they are 
no longer willing to fight, and they desert or surrender en masse, that belligerent must 
eventually, by engaging in the strategic process, also alter policy (ends must reflect 
means). Victory ensues when a belligerent comes to the conclusion that they no 
longer have the means, either physical or psychological, or both, to resist the will of 
the enemy and they alter policy (to for example surrender or enter negotiations for a 
cease fire).90 
 
As Michael Howard has put it 
 
The military means used to obtain the purposes of the war were divided by 
Clausewitz and his successors into two: Vernightungsstrategie, ‘strategy of 
annihilation’ – the destruction of the enemy capacity to defend himself by 
destroying his armed forces on the battlefield; and Ermattungsstrategie, the use of 
attrition to wear down his will to resist. The first disarms the adversary, leaving 
him literally at the mercy of the victor. The second persuades him that victory is, if 
not impossible, only obtainable at an unacceptable price.91 
 
While strategy, in the current dominant usage, is ‘designed to make war useable by 
the state, so that it can, if need be, use force to fulfill its political objectives’,92 it can 
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also be used in the sense that one might have a ‘strategy’ to cross the fireswept zone 
and capture, for example, a pill box on the other side of a field. Militaries tend to refer 
to this type of activity as ‘tactics’ or ‘drill’. However, ‘tactics’ or ‘drill’, it can be 
argued, represent nothing more than formalised pre-packaged strategy. They provide 
junior leaders with ready-made solutions to balance ends and means in oft-repeated 
military scenarios. Strategy, understood as a process appears, therefore, to play a key 
role, in different guises, at different levels of military activity and may be understood 
to increase in complexity as one climbs the levels of war. Strategy at the tactical level 
can almost always be formalised in drill. Strategy at the operational level can be 
formalised in operational doctrine. However, at the military strategic, grand strategic 
or political levels, strategy becomes so complex and contingent that it is beyond 
formalisation or doctrine and becomes truly the art of the military or political genius. 
Thus, it is fair to argue that decision makers at all levels in war have to act 
strategically (balance ends with means). Indeed, S.L.A. Marshall insisted that they 
do.93 As the strategies devised by political leaders and senior officers influence the 
goals and objectives (policies) and means available to those below them, strategy 
cascades in an interactive fashion from the top of the state apparatus to the activities 
of junior officers on the front line. To take the Second World War (and particularly 
the climactic ‘end-game’ in Northwest Europe) as an example, those in charge of the 
state (the politicians) decided that the only strategy for realising the end of protecting 
British long term interests was to wage war with Germany. As a consequence, 
decision makers (at the grand strategic level) were tasked with devising strategies to 
balance the ends of winning the war with the military, economic, diplomatic and 
intelligence means available. These strategies influenced the policy, or the goal, and 
means available at the military strategic level. Those tasked with strategy at the 
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military strategic level then had to balance these ends and means, or, if this proved 
impossible, ask their superiors to rein in ends or ramp up the means. In the case of 
Northwest Europe, commanders decided that the best way to bring about the defeat of 
the Wehrmacht on the continent was to launch an invasion across the Channel to the 
shores of Normandy. This strategy outlined the ends and means for operational level 
commanders in the British Army who had to develop their own ‘strategies’ to get 
ashore at Normandy. One element of the operational challenge was the requirement 
for 3 British Infantry Division to storm Sword beach. Thus, ‘strategy’ at the 
operational level influenced policy (or the ends) and the means available at the 
tactical level,  and junior officers had to develop their own ‘strategies’ to succeed with 
the specific assignments tasked to them on 6 June 1944.  
If we understand strategy in this manner, as an interactive process that both 
cascades down and feeds back up the levels of war, rather than a level of war or 
activity situated only as a bridge between national policy and tactics,94 we may begin 
to see inadequacies in the three broad meta-narratives of combat cohesion outlined in 
this chapter. Each ‘narrative’ explains combat cohesion as the product mainly of one 
element of strategy, rather than the emergent outcome of a complex multidimensional 
process. The ‘brute force narrative’ focuses on the ‘material capability’ element of 
military means. The ‘morale narrative’ focuses on the ‘will’ element of military 
means. The ‘tactics narrative’ tends to interpret strategy as a fixed doctrine (for 
example Biddle’s ‘modern system of force employment’) rather than a dynamic 
interactive process where means constantly affect policy as much as policy affects 
means.  Thus, the ‘tactics narrative’ assumes that formalised responses to military 
problems are adequate when, in fact, war is infinitely complex and decisions and 
activities have to be made in light of constantly shifting and evolving events (as 
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S.L.A. Marshal put it, in war ‘the unusual is met usually and the abnormal becomes 
the normal’).95 Furthermore, the ‘tactics narrative’, as Strachan has pointed out, can 
obscure the dynamic inter-linkages between the different levels of war. For example, 
it can treat tactics and operations as a ‘politics free zone’ and can, therefore, 
encourage military practitioners to ‘diverge dangerously’ from the  policies devised at 
the political, grand strategic and military strategic levels, as indeed it did with the 
German Army in the Second World War, and, arguably, in the counter insurgency 
campaigns undertaken by the British and American Armies in more recent conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.96 Strategy can, and perhaps should, be understood as an 
iterative multi-level decision-making continuum where decisions on means and ends 
at each level can affect decisions on means and ends at all other levels.   
The three broad meta-narratives of combat cohesion, unquestionably add to 
our understanding of the role of firepower, tactics and morale in battle. However, 
while it is certainly possible that firepower, tactics or morale might have played a 
dominant role in specific battles in the Northwest Europe campaign, the evidence 
derived from this study suggests that patterns of cohesion in British Second Army 
cannot be explained by reference to one ‘narrative’ on its own. In the case of Second 
Army, it appears that there was no ready-made solution to the problems of cohesion 
on the battlefield (see Figures 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4). The best that commanders could do, 
as Clausewitz argued in On War, was to recognise the components of the problem and 
manage and balance them appropriately in each battle scenario i.e. behave 
strategically.97 The individuals in Second Army, including army commanders and 
junior officers, made decisions and behaved in ways that were highly contextualised, 
contingent and interlinked. While all-encompassing theories may be attractive, the 
challenge for scholars trying to search for patterns is to recognise complexity and 
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embrace its methodological challenges rather than shy away from it in the search for 
simplicity. Indeed empiricism demands such a scholarly approach. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reevaluated the role of morale in the military strategic process. It has 
proposed a functional conceptualisation of morale, which focuses its meaning and 
relevance on motivation and the willingness to act in a manner required by an 
authority or institution. This conceptualisation of morale has facilitated a first step 
towards developing a methodologically sound quantitative approach to assessing 
morale in an historical battle context. Additionally, the conceptual and 
methodological innovations explored here have facilitated a more thorough 
interrogation of the complex web of interrelationships that shape military 
performance. The chapter offers evidence to suggest that the dominant narratives on 
combat cohesion have either over estimated or under estimated the importance of 
morale, not least perhaps due to the fact that it is typically conceptually 
misunderstood and inaccurately assessed. Thus, the findings point to the need to 
reevaluate the dominant theories on combat cohesion and put strategy, understood as 
an interactive process that both cascades down and feeds back up the levels of war, at 
the heart of any understanding of combat cohesion. 
These conclusions resonate with the broader themes of this volume. Indeed, 
the irregular wars of the twentyfirst century are more similar in nature to the 
conventional ones of the twentieth than is generally perceived.98 The use of ‘brute 
force’ by the British Army in Helmand in Afghanistan from 2006 did not produce the 
outcomes desired, nor, in recent years, has a tactical and operational approach which 
focused on ‘hearts and minds’, or the willingness (morale) of combatants and citizens 
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to fight, led to a peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan. As Hew Strachan has argued in 
relation to the German Army in 1940, ‘tactical and operational successes’ have not 
been ‘given the shape which strategy could have bestowed’.99 In Iraq and 
Afghanistan, operational doctrine, the ‘tactics’ narrative, has filled the void left by 
strategy, but, in spite of its sophistication has failed to do duty for effective 
strategy.100 Thus, cohesion at the tactical and operational levels in Iraq and 
Afghanistan cannot be understood outside of the context of strategy. Indeed, it would 
appear that combat cohesion is contingent, contextual, multidimensional and 
inherently complex and any attempt to understand it must acknowledge that reality. 
The challenge for military practitioners in the twentyfirst century, as surely it was in 
the twentieth, is to balance and coordinate ends and means at all levels of war and in 
all military scenarios. This (strategic) process requires intelligent, well-trained, highly 
motivated and well-provisioned personnel to identify the character of the war they are 
fighting and act appropriately. As Clausewitz wrote, 
  
Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems, nor can it mark 
the narrow path on which the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a hedge of 
principles on either side. But it can give the mind insight into the great mass of 
phenomena and of their relationships, then leave it free to rise into the higher 
realms of action.101  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle 
	   37	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For just a few examples see: Paul Addison and Angus Calder (eds.), Time to Kill: 
The Soldier’s Experience of War in the West 1939-1945 (London: Pimlico, 1997); 
John Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage (London: Cassell, 1967); Omer 
Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of 
Warfare (Oxford: Macmillan, 1985); Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining 
Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); 
Thomas W. Britt, Carl Andrew Castro and Amy B Adler (eds.), Military Life: The 
Psychology of Serving in Peace and Combat, Volume 1: Military Performance 
(Westport: Greenwood, 2006); Trevor N. Dupuy, ‘Theory of Combat’, in Franklin D. 
Margiotta (ed.), Brassey’s Encyclopaedia of Military History and Biography 
(Washington: Brassey’s 1994); John Ellis, The Sharp End: The Fighting Man in 
World War II (London: Pimlico 1993); Stephen G. Fritz, Frontsoldaten: The German 
Soldier in World War II (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1995); Reuven 
Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff (eds.), Handbook of Military Psychology (Chichester: 
John Wiley, 1991); Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behaviour of Men in Battle 
(London: Cassell, 2004); S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle 
Command in Future War (Alexandria: Byrdd Enterprises, Inc., 1947); Allan R. Millet 
and Williamson Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness Vol. I: The First  World War 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1988); Charles Moskos, The American Enlisted Man: The 
Rank and File in Today’s Military (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970); Sam 
C. Sarkesian (ed.), Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer 
Military (London: Sage Publications, 1980); Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, 
‘Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II’, Public Opinion 
Quarterly Summer 1948; Guy L. Siebold, ‘The Essence of Military Group Cohesion’, 
Armed Forced and Society Vol. 33, No. 2 2007; Nora Kinzer Stewart, Mates and 
	   38	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Muchachos, Unit Cohesion in the Falklands/Malvinas War (New York: Brassey’s, 
1991); Samuel A. Stouffer et al, The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath 
(New York: John Wiley 1965); Leonard Wong, Thomas A. Kolditz, Raymond A. 
Millen, Terrence A. Potter, ‘Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War’, 
Report for the Strategic Studies Institute July 2003. 
3 Anthony King, The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth 
and Twenty-First Centuries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 36. 
4 Sam C. Sarkesian, ‘Combat Effectiveness’, in Sarkesian (ed.), Combat 
Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress and the Volunteer Military. 
5 Allan R. Millet, Williamson Murray and Kenneth H. Watman, ‘The Effectiveness of 
Military Organizations’, in Millet and Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness Vol. I: 
The First World War,  2. 
6 Ibid.,  3. 
7 Millet, Murray and Watman identified two approaches, a sociological approach and 
an operational approach. 
8 Gerd Hardach, The First World War, 1914-1918 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1977), 80. 
9 Marshall, Men Against Fire, 23. 
10 Ibid., 66-7. 
11 Hew Strachan, ‘Training, Morale and Modern War’, The Journal of Contemporary 
History, Vol. 41(2), 2006, 225. 
12 John Buckley, Monty’s Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe 
(London: Yale University Press, 2013), 9; Basil Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the 
Hill (London: Cassells, 1951); Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (London: 
The Reprint Society, 1954). First published 1952. 
	   39	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 John Ellis, Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War 
(London: André Deutsch,1990), 538. 
14 See, for example, Biddle, Military Power; Buckley, Monty’s Men; Terry Copp, 
Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (London: University of Toronto Press, 
2003); David French, Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War 
against Germany 1919-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Stephen 
Ashley Hart, Colossal Cracks: Montgomery’s 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 
1944-45 (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole, 2007); Daniel P. Marston, Phoenix from the 
Ashes: The Indian Army in the Burma Campaign (London: Praeger, 2003); T.R. 
Moreman, The Jungle, The Japanese and the British Commonwealth Armies at War, 
1941-45 (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2005). 
15 Stephen Biddle, Military Power, 190. 
16 Ibid., 3. 
17 Ibid., 190. 
18 King, The Combat Soldier, 204. See also, John Baynes, Morale; John Keegan, The 
Face of Battle (London: Pimlico, 1991); Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies: Ancient and 
Modern Battle (Charleston: BiblioBazaar, 2006). 
19 King, The Combat Soldier, 41. See also Baynes, Morale and Leonard V. Smith, 
Between Mutiny and Obedience, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1994) on this 
matter. 
20 Stephen Biddle, Military Power, 207. For some exceptions see: Boff, ‘The Morale 
Maze’; Fennell, ‘In Search of the “X” Factor’; J.-F. Fils,, ‘The Measurement of 
Morale among Belgian Military Personnel Deployed in Crisis Response Operations: 
A Longitudinal Survey Design’, in Human Dimensions in Military Operations – 
Military Leaders’ Strategies for Addressing Stress and Psychological Support. 
	   40	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Meeting Proceedings RTO-MP-HFM-134, Paper 28. Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, April 
2006; J.M. Foret, ‘Measuring Morale within the French Army’, in Human 
Dimensions in Military Operations – Military Leaders’ Strategies for Addressing 
Stress and Psychological Support, Meeting Proceedings RTO-MP-HFM-134, Paper 
29. Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, April 2006; Melvin J. Kimmel and Francis E. O’Mara, 
‘The Measurement of Morale’, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioural and 
Social Sciences 1981; Melvin J. Kimmel, Francis E. O’Mara and Nehama Babin, 
‘The Development of a Unit Morale Measure for Army Battalions’, Technical Report 
617, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioural and Social Sciences, March 
1984; S.J. Motowidlo, B.E. Dowell, W.C. Borman, P.D. Johnson and M.D. Dunnette, 
‘Motivation. Satisfaction, and Morale in Army Careers: A Review of Theory and 
Measurement’, Minneapolis, Personnel Decisions Research Inst, 1976; Wilcox, 
‘Morale and Battlefield Performance at Caporetto, 1917’. 
21 Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London: Frank 
Cass, 2001), 15. 
22 Thomas W. Britt and James M. Dickinson, ‘Morale during Military Operations: A 
Positive Psychology Approach’, in Britt, Castro and Adler (eds.), Military Life, 162; 
Reuven Gal and Frederick J. Manning, ‘Morale and its Components: A Cross 
National Comparison’, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 17, No. 4 1987, 
369; Robert M. Guion, ‘Industrial Morale (A Symposium): 1. The Problem of 
Terminology’, Personnel Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 1 1958, 60-2; Motowidlo, Dowell, 
Borman, Johnson and Dunnette, ‘Motivation. Satisfaction, and Morale in Army 
Careers’, 49-52.  
23 E. Kier, ‘Homosexuality in the US Military: Open Integration and Combat 
Effectivnes’, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1998; R. MacCoun, ‘What is 
	   41	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Known about Unit Cohesion and Military Performance’, in National Defence 
Research Institute, Sexual Orientation and US Military Personnel Policy: Options and 
Assessment, Washington: RAND, 1993. 
24 John A. Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of 
Revolutionary France (Oxford: Westview Press 1996), 34-5. 
25 Stephen D. Wesbrook, ‘The Potential for Military Disintegration’, in Sarkessian 
(ed.), Combat Effectiveness, 257. 
26 John Keegan, ‘Towards a Theory of Combat Motivation’ in Addison and Calder 
(eds.), Time to Kill, 6. 
27 Ibid. Hew Strachan has also argued that coercion is not always given enough 
recognition as a motivational tool (Hew Strachan, ‘The Soldier’s Experience in Two 
World Wars: Some Historiographical Comparisons’, in Addison and Calder (eds.), 
Time to Kill, 374-5. 
28 Marshall, Men Against Fire, 165. 
29 Stouffer et al, The American Soldier, 101. 
30 National Archives (NA) WO 277/7 A.B. McPherson, ‘The Second World War 
1939-1945, Army Discipline’, 2. 
31 Imperial War Museum (IWM) 99/1/2 Major General Raymond Briggs Papers, 
Paper by Field-Marshal Montgomery, ‘Morale in Battle: Analysis’, 30 April 1946,  
43. 
32 Ibid., 47-8. 
33 Ibid., 51-3. 
34 Douglas A. Bernstein, Alison Clarke-Stewart, Edward J. Roy, Christopher D. 
Wickens, Psychology (Boston, Houghton Mifflin,1997), 337. 
	   42	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 In fact, one of Britt’s other studies supports this view. He asked a small sample of 
soldiers to indicate what they thought were the key characteristics of morale. He 
found that soldiers were most likely to indicate the attributes of motivation and drive 
in their views of morale (Britt and Dickinson, ‘Morale during Military Operations’, in 
Britt, Castro and Adler (eds.), Military Life, 163). 
36 Marshall, Men Against Fire, 157-8. 
37 Leonard Wong, Thomas A. Kolditz, Raymond A. Millen, Terrence A. Potter, ‘Why 
They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War’, Report for the Strategic Studies 
Institute, July 2003. 
38 Jonathan Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third Army 
and the Defeat of Germany in 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); 
Jonathan Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign: The Eighth 
Army and the Path to El Alamein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); 
Alexander Watson, Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the 
German and British Armies, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008).  
39 John Buckley, British Armour in the Normandy Campaign 1944 (London: Frank 
Cass, 2004); Buckley, Monty’s Men; David French, “‘Tommy is no soldier’: The 
Morale of the Second British Army in Normandy, June-August 1944”, Journal of 
Strategic Studies 19:4, 1994, 154-178. See also, Terry Copp and Bill McAndrew, 
Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945 
(London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990). 
40 Fennell, Combat and Morale, Chapter One. 
41 F.A.E. Crew, The Army Medical Services, Campaigns, Volume IV, North-West 
Europe (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1962), 563. 
	   43	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Field Marshal Montgomery, Despatch, The London Gazette, 3 September 1946 in 
Crew, The Army Medical Services, North-West Europe, 560. 
43 NA WO 177/321 Monthly Report for June 1944 by Psychiatrist Attached 2nd Army, 
7 July 1944. 
44 Library and Archives Canada (LAC) Volume 12631 File No. 11/Psychiatry/5 
Reports, Major R.A. Gregory, Neuro-psychiatrist 3 Canadian Infantry Division, 
‘Psychiatric Report’, October 1944. 
45 SIW were punished with 2 years imprisonment with hard labour. Desertion, by 
comparison, was punished with 3 years penal servitude – Australian War Memorial 
(AWM) 54 624/2/6 Report on Functions of ‘AG’s’ Branch During Invasion of 
Western Europe, 1944, 237-8. 
46 Crew, The Army Medical Services, North-West Europe, 326. 
47 NA WO 285/25 Report on ‘Soldiers Under Sentence’ for Such Offences as 
Desertion, Cowardice, Mutiny etc., Whose Cases Have Been Reviewed in British 
Second Army, June 1945. 
48 See, for example, NA WO 204/6701 Morale British Troops in Italy, 1943 to 1945; 
AWM 54 423/11/98 Middle East Military Weekly Censorship Summaries, Covering 
Dominion, Colonial and Allied Forces, Allied Air Forces, Women's Forces and 
British Prisoners of War in Enemy hands, 1942. 
49 Of the rest, 135 were transferred for service in other parts of the Army, 13 were 
identified as ‘irreconcilable types’ and kept in prison, 12 were admitted to a 
psychiatric hospital and one was discharged from the Army altogether. 
50 NA WO 285/25 Report on ‘Soldiers Under Sentence’ for Such Offences as 
Desertion, Cowardice, Mutiny etc., Whose Cases Have Been Reviewed in British 
Second Army, June 1945. 
	   44	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 WO 177/336 War Diary H.Q. (Medical) 1 British Corps, January 1945, Appendix 
IV: Quarterly Report by Brigadier Q.V.B. Wallace, D.D.M.S. 1 Corps, Quarter 
Ending 31 December 1944, Appendix B: Some Notes on Medical Ops. 
52 Lieutenant-Colonel A.T.A. Browne, ‘A Study of the Anatomy of Fear and Courage 
in War’, The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal 106: 3, 1976, 3-4. 
53 See Fennell, Combat and Morale and ‘In Search of the “X” Factor’. 
54 The scale, therefore, approximates to what is known as an ‘equal appearing interval 
scale’.  
55 NA WO 177/321 D.D.M.S. 2nd Army, War Diaries, 1943-44; NA WO 177/322 
D.D.M.S. 2nd Army, War Diaries, 1945. Precise weekly figures for battle casualties 
(broken down into battle wounds, battle accidents, SIW and burns) are contained in 
WO 177/322 in an appendix to a ‘Report on Surgery in Second Army in the 
Northwest Europe Campaign, 1944-45’.  
56 Due attention was given to the difference between ‘admissions’ and ‘incidence’ in 
order to avoid double counting. Admissions refer to the total number of new cases in 
each period; ‘incidence’ refers to the total number of cases being treated during each 
period (thus, it could include admissions from a previous period). However, in the 
case of battle exhaustion, the absolute figures for ‘admissions’ and ‘incidence’ were 
extremely similar. For example, the battle exhaustion figures for the period of the 
Normandy campaign calculated here tally almost exactly with the figures presented as 
‘exhaustion cases’ in French, ‘“Tommy is no soldier”’, 173. They also tally almost 
exactly with absolute figures presented elsewhere in the primary sources. 
Accordingly, there appears to be little danger of double counting. The similarity in the 
‘admissions’ and ‘incidence’ figures may be explained by the quick turnaround 
experienced by those who suffered from battle exhaustion (5 to 7 days in July 1944). 
	   45	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
See for example, NA WO 177/321 Report by Psychiatrist Attached to 2nd Army for 
Month of July 1944. In some cases where exact numbers for battle exhaustion were 
found in the sources, they were used in preference to the computed figure. 
57 WO 177/322 Report on Surgery in Second Army in Northwest Europe, 1944 to 
1945. 
58 WO 171/182 War Diaries, Deputy Judge Advocate General, 21st Army Group, 
April to December 1944; Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA) De 
Guingand Papers, Administrative History of 21 Army Group, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 
1945. 
59 French, “‘Tommy is no soldier”’; Buckley, British Armour in the Normandy 
Campaign, 200-202.  
60 WO 177/321 D.D.M.S. 2nd Army, War Diaries, 1943-44; WO 177/322 D.D.M.S. 
2nd Army, War Diaries, 1945; LAC Volume 12630 File No. 11/Psychiatry/1/2 Lt-
Col. J.C. Richardson, 'Memorandum about Current Neuropsychiatric Problems in the 
Canadian Army in the European Theatre of Operations, 27 October 1944; WO 285/18 
2nd Army, Health Reports, December 1944 to June 1945. Figures for casualties 
(which include battle wounds, battle accidents and burns, but not killed in action or 
captured) have been included in case a reader wishes to calculate the percentage of 
e.g. battle exhaustion to wounded. 
61 LHCMA De Guingand Papers, Administrative History of 21 Army Group, 6 June 
1944 to 8 May 1945; NA WO 171/182 War Diaries, Deputy Judge Advocate General, 
21st Army Group, April to December 1944. The figures presented here are higher 
than those in French, ‘“Tommy is no soldier”’, 172. This may be because French does 
not include the independent armoured brigades and line of command troops in his 
figures. 
	   46	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 103 and 105 Reinforcement Groups accounted for 76 courts martial for desertion 
and 244 for absence in July 1944 and 112 for desertion and 417 for absence in August 
1944. 103 and 105 Reinforcement Groups moved to the continent in September 1944 
and, therefore, figures from these units have been included from this period onwards.  
63 The findings from this research are explored further in the author’s upcoming book, 
The Peoples’ Armies: The British and Commonwealth Armies and the Second World 
War (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2015). 
64 The figures for May were not included as the German Army surrendered to 21st 
Army Group on 6 May 1945. 
65 Where a week straddled two months, sick, battle exhaustion and SIW figures were 
assigned to each month in proportion to the number of days of the week that fell in 
each month. 
66 A strong correlation between two variables would produce an r-value in excess of 
+0.9 or -0.9. T. Lucy, Quantitative Techniques (Continuum: London, 1996), 113. 
67 Incidences of excellent morale coincided with figures of between 20 and 30 sick, 
battle exhaustion, desertion, AWOL and SIW per 1,000. Incidences of high morale 
coincided with figures between 30 and 40 per thousand etc. These findings were 
verified statistically by use of principal coordinate analysis and a T-Test. 
68 The summary did, however, include a very small number of letters from Guards 
Armoured Division on 18 July 1944.  
69 These weekly morale scale equivalents were computed by dividing the monthly 
levels from table 8.1 by 31 and multiplying by 7.  
70 See, for example, Buckley, Monty’s Men, Hart, Collosal Cracks. 
71 Buckley, Monty’s Men, 208-31. 
72 Hart, Collosal Cracks. 
	   47	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 WO 219/1531 Casualty Reports, British, Canadian and US Forces Daily 
Summaries, including enemy prisoners taken, June to October 1944; WO 219/1532 
Casualty Reports, British, Canadian and US Forces Daily Summaries, including 
enemy prisoners taken, Oct 1944 to Mar 1945; WO 177/316 Medical Diaries, 
D.D.M.S. 21st Army Group, 1944; LHCMA Papers of Gen Sir Harold English Pyman 
5/21, 'A Short Account of the Operations of the Second British Army'. 
74 NA CAB 106/1084 Army Operational Research Group Memorandum No. E20, 
‘Some Statistics of the North West European Campaign, June 1944 to May 1945’, 27. 
75 WO 219/1531 Casualty Reports, British, Canadian and US Forces Daily 
Summaries, including enemy prisoners taken, June to October 1944; WO 219/1532 
Casualty Reports, British, Canadian and US Forces Daily Summaries, including 
enemy prisoners taken, Oct 1944 to Mar 1945; WO 177/316 Medical Diaries, 
D.D.M.S. 21st Army Group, 1944; LHCMA Papers of Gen Sir Harold English Pyman 
5/21, 'A Short Account of the Operations of the Second British Army'; NA CAB 
106/1084 Some Statistics of the North West European Campaign, June 1944 to May 
1945. 
76 Derived from statistics presented in NA CAB 106/1084, Some Statistics of the 
North West European Campaign, June 1944 to May 1945. The extent to which the 
ten-day periods coincide with bombardments and advances could possibly distort 
these relationships, but probably not sufficiently to take from the overall thrust of the 
argument outlined here. 
77 Biddle, Military Power; French, Raising Churchill’s Army; Hart, Colossal Cracks. 
78 Buckley, Monty’s Men, 29. 
79 Daniel J. Hughes, Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings (Novato, CA: 
Presidio, 1993). 
	   48	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Copp, Fields of Fire; Buckley, Monty’s Men. 
81 Clausewitz, On War, 83. 
82 Hew Strachan, ‘A Clausewitz for Every Season’, American Interest, July/August 
2007, 33. 
83 Clausewitz, On War, 207. 
84 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1999),17. 
85 Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London: Faber and Faber, 
1967), 335. 
86 Hew Strachan, ‘Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level 
of War’, Survival 52:5, 2010,158. 
87 Hew Strachan, ‘The Lost Meaning of Strategy’, Survival 47: 3, Autumn 2005, 52.  
88 Clausewitz, On War, 86. 
89 For other studies that have made use of Clausewitz’s perspective of the relationship 
between ‘means’ and ‘will’, see Mark Clodfelter, ‘Aiming to Break Will: America’s 
World War II Bombing of German Morale and its Ramifications’, Journal of 
Strategic Studies 33:3, 2010; Niall Ferguson, ‘Prisoner Taking and Prisoner Killing in 
the Age of Total War: Towards a Political Economy of Military Defeat’, War in 
History 11:2, 2004; Michael Howard, ‘When are Wars Decisive?’, Survival 41:1, 
1999. 
90 This understanding of strategy appears to apply also to nuclear wars and limited 
‘small’ wars. See Fennell, ‘In Search of the “X” Factor’. 
91 Michael Howard, ‘When are Wars Decisive?’, Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1 1999, 128. 
92 Strachan, ‘The Lost Meaning of Strategy’, 49.  
93 Marshal, Men Against Fire,190. 
94 Strachan, ‘The Lost Meaning of Strategy’, 36-40.  
	   49	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Marshall, Men Against Fire, 184. 
96 Strachan, ‘The Lost Meaning of Strategy’, 47.  
97 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (London: Everyman Library, 1993). First published 
in 1832.  
98 See for example, Colin M. Fleming, ‘New or Old Wars? Debating a Clausewitzian 
Future’, Journal of Strategic Studies 32:2, 2009; Bart Shuurman, ‘Clausewitz and the 
“New Wars” Scholars’, Parameters, Spring 2010. 
99 Strachan, ‘The Lost Meaning of Strategy’, 46. 
100 Strachan, ‘Strategy or Alibi?’ 157-182. 
101 Clausewitz, On War, 698. 
